Scarcity of spectrum limits the number of competing network operators in mobile telecoms. In the United Kingdom a regulatory review is currently enquiring into the effects of limited competition in the mobile market. The European Commission is also reviewing competition in roaming across mobile networks in Europe. In the UK the industry regulator Oftel claims that the prices for calling mobile phones are too high. We show that such relatively high prices stem from asymmetric incentives. The convention in the UK is for the originating party to pay for a telephone call. If instead the receiver were to pay for some or all of a call, we show that prices of calls to mobiles would be lower. We also argue that qualified indirect access could stimulate more effective competition in mobile telecoms.
Introduction
The growth in significance of mobile or cellular telephony in recent years has been very dramatic. Before 1985 in the UK mobile telephony was only used by special groups like the security forces. In 1998 over 8 million or over 15% of the population of the UK subscribed to a mobile network and according to Oftel (1998b) phone ownership is growing at 20% a year. The striking growth in the popularity of mobile phones is mirrored around the world, despite relatively high prices for certain mobile services.
As cellular telephony makes use of a scarce resource, spectrum, this necessarily constrains the number of operating networks. For example, in the UK and in other European countries there are between two and four national digital GSM networks.
Inevitably with such small numbers of operators competition may not be effective.
Nevertheless, the number of operators in most countries has increased in recent years and this has resulted in more competition, see OECD (1996) .
In the UK the regulatory authorities in the mid-1980s anticipated that the constraint on the number of network operators might compromise competition in cellular telephony markets. Hence it was decided as a matter of policy that competition would be stimulated through service providers. For this to work the network operators were originally not permitted to sell services directly to customers. This was achieved by separating the industry into network operators and downstream service providers, see Geroski et al. (1989) .
However, this policy failed to deliver effective competition as the service providers acted largely as airtime resellers on behalf of the network operators. Furthermore, over time the authorities relaxed and then removed the constraints on the network operators preventing them from selling direct to customers. The inadequacy of competition in UK mobile telephony prompted the industry regulator Oftel to investigate the industry in 1996 and in 1998 it concluded that the price of calling mobile phones was too high, see Oftel (1998a) .
Oftel has proposed remedies to deal with the lack of competition in the industry. These rely on intrusive price regulation focused both on the level and structure of prices. In this paper we argue that these measures are heavy-handed and unnecessary. Alternative remedies exist which can stimulate greater competition in the industry and alter the incentives facing operators to bring about lower prices for calling mobile phones.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we describe in brief the structure of the industry and the policy issues that have been raised recently. Section 3 outlines the key economic characteristics of the industry. In section 4 we appeal to the relevant economic theory that is a useful guide to policy design. Section 5 introduces the concept of the 'receiver pays principle' (RPP). RPP is argued to be a way of changing the incentives faced by mobile operators so that they encourage the setting of lower prices for calls to mobiles. In section 6 the concept of 'qualified indirect access ' (QIA) is explored. QIA is argued to be a method for stimulating more effective competition into an industry that inherently has a finite limit on the number of network operators.
Section 7 concludes the paper by summarising our policy prescriptions.
The mobile telecoms market in the UK: structure and issues

Structure
Since the introduction of cellular phones in the UK in 1985, mobile communications have been transformed from a virtually exclusive business product to one that has extended to the mass market. The UK mobile market is forecast to grow from 7.66 million users (2.117 analogue users and 5.543 digital users) in September 1997 to an where it stands at over 30%. 2 Recent penetration rates (customers per 100 capita) in mobile telephony for a selection of countries is shown in Figure 1 . Although the market has many service providers, price competition in user tariffs "has been less strong than might appear" and "the networks' recommended retail tariffs are closely followed by almost all service providers" 5 .
Cellnet and Vodafone prior to 1994 were prohibited from selling services direct to the public. Instead services sold to the public through service providers, tied and independent.
Issues
The main policy issue in the mobile telecoms market in the UK is the regulatory investigation into the price of calls to mobile phones. In June 1996 Oftel began investigating the apparent high cost of making calls to mobile phones and in March 1997 issued a consultative document, Oftel (1997) . In December 1997 the DGT (Director General of Telecommunications) claimed that Cellnet and Vodafone set discriminatory termination charges. In March 1998 Oftel made a Statement on the price of calls to mobile phones, and referred three matters to the MMC (Monopolies and Mergers Commission). These dealt with the interconnection or termination charges set by Cellnet and Vodafone and the retention charges levied by BT, the main fixed line operator in the UK.
In May Oftel submitted its evidence to the MMC, see Oftel (1998b) . The Oftel submission is predicated on heavy-handed regulation as it is proposing to regulate both the structure and level of prices in the mobile market on the basis of measures of forward looking long-run incremental costs. Oftel has rightly identified that termination charges exceed cost, but its proposed remedies are not necessarily the most effective for dealing with the problem. Oftel is proposing that for the foreseeable future BT's charges for handling calls to mobile phones (BT's rentention rate) should be subject to a RPI-X price-cap. Furthermore, it is also proposed that the structure of prices be regulated: the price charged by BT for calling a mobile phone should be the same irrespective of the mobile network called. Oftel is also proposing that the interconnection charges levied by Cellnet and Vodafone should be reduced and subject to RPI-X price-caps.
The key economic characteristics of the mobile market
The relatively high prices charged for making calls to mobile phones stem from five features found in the UK market place. These are: 3. Numbering of mobile phones in the UK means that whenever a subscriber currently changes network he has to change his telephone number. For some customers this can present a large switching cost. However, number portability is to be introduced into the UK from January 1999 which should largely alleviate this problem.
4. The caller pays principle is the established way in which mobile and fixed telephony services are sold in the UK. It should be emphasised that this is a convention and not a necessity. There is an alternative: RPP. Indeed, RPP could possibly overcome one of the problems referred to the MMC by the DGT, see section 5 below.
5. Call patterns in the UK are such that the majority of calls made on mobile networks terminate on fixed networks, whereas only a small fraction of calls made on fixed networks terminate on mobile networks. Furthermore, only a small proportion of calls originating on mobile networks terminate on mobile networks. Thus call patterns are asymmetric.
Insights from economic theory
Economic theory provides some useful guidance to the problems. The subject under investigation falls into an area known as two-way interconnection. Two-way interconnection is best understood in a simple stylised setting. Consider two firms A and B selling services to customers. Think of A and B as two ferry operators offering services between ports X and Y, where port X is owned by firm A and port Y is owned by firm B. In this setting firm A (B) can affect the price firm B (A) charges its customers through the harbour fee it levies on firm B (A) for access to its port facilities in X (Y).
A straightforward application of economic principles would show that in the absence of collusion between the two firms, access charges will be set in excess of cost and therefore final prices will also exceed cost. Indeed, if a separate access charge is set by each firm double-marginalisation arises. In practice access charges are likely to be reciprocal, that is the access charge at each port will be the same. In this case the ferry operators could achieve monopoly final prices through setting a high access charge, despite any appearance of vigorous competition in final markets.
Armstrong (1998) and Tirole (1998a,1998b) outline two-way interconnection issues and Laffont and Tirole (1998) have studied the problem in greatest depth. Two-way interconnection is a characteristic of the mobile telecommunications industry in the UK. So does the economic literature confirm the DGT's insights?
The literature suggests that under certain conditions final prices will exceed costs and may even approach monopoly levels because of monopoly power in access markets.
What are these certain conditions? The conditions which seem critical that lead to monopoly pricing are:
1. Sufficiently differentiated services 2. Linear prices
Market symmetry
How well do the above describe the mobile market in the UK? Probably not well at all.
Although services are differentiated to some extent, chiefly between GSM 900 and GSM1800 services, most customers regard Cellnet and Vodafone to be very similar. It may be argued that coverage (and hence quality) differs across the networks, but the coverage differences between Cellnet and Vodafone are insignificant. Linear prices are not offered to consumers: instead more general two-part tariffs characterise pricing in UK mobile telephony markets. According to Laffont and Tirole (1998) more general tariffs of this kind tend to undermine monopoly pricing in two-way interconnection markets.
As mentioned above, in terms of call patterns the UK market is certainly not symmetric. Nevertheless, we present a simple model below which shows in an asymmetric setting how two firms offering possibly identical mobile telephony services can nevertheless result in monopoly pricing.
An asymmetric model of two-way interconnection: caller pays principle
Here we characterise the UK mobile telephony industry as currently exists under the caller pays principle (CPP) in a stylised setting. For simplicity suppose there are three firms A, B and C, where A and B supply mobile telephony services and firm C supplies fixed telephony services. Let the demand for outgoing calls at firms A and B be given by q i =q i (p A , p B ) for i=A,B where p A and p B denote prices of calls. Let the demand function for each firm be identical, and suppose that each is well behaved.
For simplicity assume that all calls made by subscribers at A and B terminate off-net on to the fixed network C. (In practice the majority of calls on UK mobile networks terminate on fixed networks, and the majority of these terminate on BT's network.)
Let the demand for calls made by fixed subscribers to mobile users on network i be given by q ci = q ci (p ci ,q i ), where p ci is the price charged by network C for making calls to mobile network i. We assume that calls to mobile network i are an increasing function of the demand for network i services. In other words, there is a network externality effect.
Assume that costs at all firms are linear and fixed costs are absent. (In practice fixed costs are present, but we make this assumption for simplifying reasons.) Assume that each mobile network faces a cost -i >0 for originating and terminating a call, the fixed network has a cost -C >0 for terminating or originating a call, and -i >-C for each i=A,B. Thus the incremental cost of mobile termination exceeds that associated with the fixed network, as in practice. Let the termination charges levied by an operator on another operator for delivering a call to a recipient be denoted t j for j=A,B or C.
Each mobile network i=A,B seeks to maximise profits given by the following:
The first part of the expression shows the profits derived from off-net calls, and the second part of the expression shows the profits derived from calls made from the fixed network to the mobile network. It is straightforward to see that each mobile network sets t i >-i . Each mobile network chooses a termination charge t i and a retail price p i .
Note that the retail price p i affects the quantity of incoming traffic: as it attracts more (fewer) customers it receives more (fewer) calls.
The fixed network seeks to maximise profits given by the following:
We assume that each mobile network knows that the fixed network chooses the price p Ci given the termination charges t i and the retail prices p i . The first order conditions for the fixed operator are:
The first term in the above expression is positive and as the derivative of the demand function for calls to mobile network i is assumed to be negative, it follows that (p Ci -t i --C )>0. Thus p Ci >-i +-C , in words: the fixed network sets the price of calls to mobile networks above the costs associated with such calls. We can write p Ci (t i , p A ,p B ) > t i +-C . Not surprisingly the higher t i the higher the price set by the fixed network to call
the mobile network. (This can be seen formally by totally differentiating the above first order condition.) Furthermore, the fixed network sets its termination charge t C above incremental cost -C .
Each mobile network through its choice of termination charge t i maximises the value of incoming revenues so that:
The above first order condition implies that double-marginalisation arises, because the mobile network i chooses a termination price in excess of its incremental cost (t i --i )>0. (In practice negotiations between the fixed and mobile operator i are likely to lead to double-marginalisation not occurring, but nevertheless in the framework here monopoly excess would still arise.)
Each mobile operator i also chooses its retail price p i to maximise profits, and this results in a first order condition as follows:
From the above we can see that the retail price p i is a function of the rivals' price and the price set by the fixed network. The fixed network uses the above first order condition in its own maximisation programme when setting its termination charge.
Again a double-marginalisation problem arises.
It is perfectly possible for p i -t C --i to be negative, i.e. the mobile network may set its retail price below the cost associated with these calls. It does not follow, of course, that the price the mobile operator sets is necessarily below the economic cost associated with these calls. Consider the extreme case where the mobile operators offer identical services. (Differentiability of the demand functions no longer holds in this case.) In this setting Bertrand competition leads to call charges from the mobile
networks to the fixed network lying below cost, i.e. p i <t C + -i . The monopoly pricing due to the fixed network bottleneck distorts the structure of prices, with mobile to fixed prices lying below accounting costs and fixed to mobile call charges lying above accounting costs. In a more general setting (i.e. with imperfect competition due to differentiated services in the mobile market) this distortion will persist, but mobile to fixed charges will be higher. In the limit, when services are completely different (not a case in practice), monopoly pricing occurs in mobile to fixed markets.
The important insight from the above is the fact that the prices set for calls to the mobile sector depend on the prices set in the mobile to fixed market. The higher the charges levied for mobile to fixed networks, the greater will be the price of calls to mobile networks. Thus remedying problems in the fixed to mobile market can be influenced to some extent by competition in the mobile to fixed market.
In an asymmetric market structure like that found in UK mobile telecoms two-way interconnection results in monopoly prices due to the application of monopoly power in access markets.
Changing incentives: the receiver pays principle
If the MMC rules that matters referred by the DGT are against the public interest, recommendations can be made whereby Oftel could remedy effectively the problems in the mobile market. 6 This could be achieved through a license amendment that incorporates RPP. The system would work as follows. A person making a call from a fixed phone to a mobile phone would pay a price equal to the relevant peak/off-peak fixed price of a local fixed call. The person receiving the call would make-up the difference between the posted price of a fixed to mobile call and the lower charge paid by the call originator. The posted price of a fixed to mobile call would be set by the mobile operator. Introducing this principle is straightforward and has the appealing property of keeping customer tariffs simple: callers need not be concerned about whether they are calling a fixed or mobile number. 7 More significantly, a caller will know for sure what he is paying for a call irrespective of the terminating mobile network.
RPP, more fundamentally, means that the incentives faced by the mobile operators' change significantly. In the present regime where the caller pays, mobile operators can set high termination charges without this leading to a direct impact on the well-being of their own mobile subscribers. Indeed, mobile subscribers currently worry almost exclusively about the cost of outgoing calls. (There is an exception in the case of international roaming where the RPP already applies.) Under a receiver pays regime, if a mobile operator sets higher termination charges it will necessarily decrease demand among its own subscribers for its own services -because of a direct relationship between termination charges and subscriber well-being (utility). Below we show formally that the receiver pays principle can result in low termination charges. Note the prescribed remedy does not rely on heavy-handed regulation and it enables more effective competition to take place.
An asymmetric model of two-way interconnection: receiver pays principle
We modify the model outlined in section 4.1 above and consider the case where the receiver pays for calls. Some simplifying assumptions are made to the analysis. Assume that the fixed operator sets a price for calls to the mobile operators equal to the price charged for calls to other fixed networks. For simplicity assume that this price is regulated and equals -C (alternatively competition in the fixed market results in incremental cost pricing), and that the termination charge set by the fixed network also equals -C . Let the 'posted' price p Ci for calls from the fixed network to mobile network i be set according to the rule: p Ci =t i + -C . The customers of the mobile network are 7 Indeed, dual-mode handsets which allow intelligent switching between the fixed and mobile systems like the Ericsson TH688 means that callers will shortly not know whether they are calling a fixed or mobile phone even if the number dialled is a mobile number. Such a technological innovation and further innovations in the pipeline strengthen considerably the case for RPP.
assumed to pay p Ci --C for receiving a call, i.e. t i . Ideally it should be the case that t i = -i . The demand function for services from each mobile network is modified; demand decreases in the termination charge t i .
The profit maximisation problem for each mobile network becomes:
Note that the above differs from the case previously because the demand for mobile to fixed services now depends on the posted price p Ci . The problem can be simplified as the mobile network's choice of termination charge implies the selection of the posted price. The first order conditions for the mobile networks are:
From the above we can observe that that the sum of (p i --C --i ) and (t i --i ) is positive.
The more responsive calls to mobiles are in response to the demand for mobile services, the closer are termination charges to incremental costs. Imperfect competition, however, means that prices will not equate with costs and termination charges will exceed incremental costs the more responsive is the demand for fixed to mobile calls as the demand for mobile calls changes (i.e. the cross-elasticity of demand is high).
Consider the case of homogeneous mobile services. In this situation a firm can gain the entire market either by reducing its retail price or by lowering its termination charge.
(A full model accounting for the indirect utility functions would leave the firm
indifferent about which price to change.) Clearly in this case there is a multiplicity of equilibria. In some of the equilibria the retail price may lie above incremental cost and the termination charge may lie below incremental cost.
Under RPP and with regulation or competition governing the retail price of the fixed network, the elimination of double-marginalisation lowers prices. In some cases termination charges set by the mobile network will be lower than in the CP case. This is more likely if demand for the mobile network's services is more responsive to termination charges.
In addition to promoting more effective competition, RPP does away with the need for uniform charges set by a fixed operator for calls to all mobile operators. Thus Oftel's proposal for uniform prices, which places a serious regulatory impediment in the market on the structure of prices, is unnecessary. Furthermore, this proposal clearly weakens the prospects for operators to compete differentially across VPNs (virtual private networks). Under RPP the caller will, of course, face a uniform price, but the receiver of a call need not pay the same contribution on each mobile network. Indeed, mobile networks will compete more effectively to lower the amount their subscribers contribute towards the cost of incoming calls.
RPP already operates in a limited way in the UK. Orange offers its subscribers the option of purchasing a fixed line number with a city prefix code. A customer may purchase a number that would be recognised as a London number, for example it may have a prefix 0171. A call made to this number is charged at a rate equivalent to the fixed line charge levied when calling a London fixed line number. The difference between this amount and the higher charge levied for calling a mobile number is made up by the recipient of the call. The service is intended to appeal to businesses who are seeking to attract incoming calls, much like free phone 800 numbers do in fixed telephony networks. RPP also works both for international roaming on GSM mobile networks, for call-divert within national territories, and in the United States and Canada.
The use of RPP in North America has been argued by some to limit the growth in cellular penetration and use. In particular, it is often argued that subscribers withhold disclosure of their numbers to deter unwanted incoming calls. However, with digital systems caller line identification (CLI) and tariffs which permit the first minute of an incoming call to be free, such as practised by Sprint PCS, help to prevent this.
Effective Competition: qualified indirect access
The problems in the mobile market in the UK that the DGT has referred to the MMC cannot be looked at in isolation. As shown above, the prices set for calls to mobile phones affect and are affected by the prices set for calls made from mobile phones to fixed networks. As the prices of calls from mobile phones are affected by the market structure and by the conduct of firms in the market, it follows that the price of calls to mobile phones are similarly affected.
With only four network operators in the UK competition involves a small number of players. It is well known that where there are more firms in a market, competition is likely to be more effective. We disagree with Oftel that "the market for mobile services is not open to additional competition". 8 Not only may RPP lead to greater competition, additional competition can also arise through indirect access. We believe that option 2, QIA, is the preferred option. We consider each in turn. Arguably MAQIAOs may compromise the network operators investment strategies.
This seems a vacuous argument. The networks are assured a fair return from the sale of services to QIAOs. Furthermore, in some instances, particularly through MA and the offering of innovative services, demand would be stimulated. As QIAOs would always need access to the base station infrastructures of the network operators, any 13 An operator may be defined as having significant market power under the Interconnection Directive.
stimulus to the market should in fact lead to greater investments. The only investments that may be "compromised" are those pertaining to marketing and in the area of customer support (billing, etc.).
Option 3: UIA UIA would allow any OLO with Annex II status to interconnect with the mobile networks (or at least with those defined as having SMP). This would obviously lead to more service providers serving the market, but most of these would simply be repackaging existing services. While there is some scope for this today, the additional benefits from further entry of this kind would be limited to certain users (e.g. outgoing international calling).
However, UIA would damage the prospects for those operators seeking to establish a wide range of telecommunication services. This is because margins on voice would be cut dramatically and this would erode the revenue streams needed for small start-up operations seeking to deliver innovative market offerings. UMTS service provision would likely suffer as UIA entry would likely lead to less dynamic new information or content based service providers emerging. This is because up-front costs (endogenous sunk costs) would not be covered by other revenues. In addition, many small indirect access providers would increase interconnection costs significantly with little obvious compensating benefits flowing to customers, bearing in mind that new entry would likely concentrate on outgoing calls.
14 On the basis of the above it would seem that MAQIA is a way to promote more effective competition in UK mobile telephony. If necessary UIA could be introduced after a temporary period of exclusion in favour of QIAOs.
Conclusion
We have looked at competition in the mobile telephony industry and the case of ineffective competition in the UK industry. We described the structure of the UK industry and outlined the measures that have been proposed by the regulatory authorities for dealing with monopoly problems. These measures are based on pricecaps that seek to establish cost-based prices. We believe that the intention of the regulatory authorities is honourable, but the means to the end is unsatisfactory. In the paper we have argued that the receiver pays principle and qualified indirect access can deal more effectively with the competition problems identified. These policy prescriptions could be deployed in mobile industries around the world.
switches, home location registers, billing platforms, value added service platforms, IN development platforms, IP gateways, etc.).
